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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






IN RE:  ARTHUR D’AMARIO, III, 
      Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 1-18-cv-10552) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
May 23, 2019 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 







 Arthur D’Amario, III, petitions for a writ of mandamus.  We will deny his petition. 
 D’Amario has a long history of unsuccessfully challenging his criminal 
convictions, including two convictions for threatening federal judges in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).  D’Amario’s challenges have continued even though he completed 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




his most recent sentence in 2014.  In 2015, for example, he filed both (1) an application 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244 for leave to file a successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and 
(2) a petition for a writ of error coram nobis and/or a writ of audita querela.  He argued, 
among other things, that his convictions under § 115(a)(1)(B) are invalid following 
Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).  We denied D’Amario’s § 2244 
application, in part because he no longer was in custody.  (C.A. No. 15-3462, Nov. 17, 
2015).  We also affirmed the denial of his coram nobis/audita querela petition.  See 
D’Amario v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 668 F. App’x 406, 407 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam). 
 D’Amario later raised his challenge under Elonis again in a habeas petition under 
28 U.S.C. § 2241.  That petition remains pending in the District Court.  Our Chief Judge 
designated the Honorable Paul S. Diamond to preside over that petition.  D’Amario, who 
also has a long history of unsuccessfully seeking Judge Diamond’s disqualification,1 filed 
below a motion for assignment to a different District Judge.  That motion remains 
pending as well. 
D’Amario now has filed another mandamus petition asking us to (1) remove Judge 
Diamond from this case, and (2) order a replacement judge to adjudicate his habeas 
petition “forthwith.”  We deny those requests.  Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy 
that we have the discretion to grant only when, among other things, “there is no other 
adequate means to obtain the desired relief.”  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 353 F.3d 211, 
                                              
1 See, e.g., In re D’Amario, 570 F. App’x 111, 111 (3d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (denying 
mandamus petition); In re D’Amario, 442 F. App’x 657, 659 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 
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219 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, we have held that “[m]andamus is a 
proper means for this court to review a district court judge’s refusal to recuse from a case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).”  Id. at 219 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted).  
When the District Judge has yet to refuse a request for recusal, however, it cannot be said 
that a petitioner has no recourse but to seek the extraordinary remedy of mandamus from 
this Court.  See id. at 223-24. 
In this case, D’Amario’s motion in the District Court effectively seeks Judge 
Diamond’s recusal, and it remains pending before Judge Diamond.  Thus, review of this 
issue by mandamus is premature.  In so ruling, we do not suggest that review by 
mandamus would be appropriate if Judge Diamond were to deny D’Amario’s motion.  To 
the contrary, the arguments for recusal that D’Amario raises in his mandamus petition 
appear little different than those we repeatedly have rejected.  Nevertheless, it would be 
premature for us to decide that issue now and we decline to do so. 
D’Amario does not expressly request an order requiring Judge Diamond to rule on 
his motion.  Even if his mandamus petition could be construed to request that relief, 
however, we would deny it.  D’Amario filed his motion for reassignment on January 15, 
2019.  Although some time has passed since then, any delay in ruling on the motion does 
not yet amount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.  See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 
79 (3d Cir. 1996).  We are confident that Judge Diamond will rule on D’Amario’s motion 
in due course.  Finally, without any basis to order Judge Diamond’s disqualification, 
                                                                                                                                                  
(same); In re D’Amario, 367 F. App’x 355, 356 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (same). 
4 
 
there is no basis to order a replacement judge to rule on D’Amario’s habeas petition 
forthwith.   
For these reasons, we will deny D’Amario’s mandamus petition. 
